The recent indictment and detention of former Samsung employees who leaked core semiconductor technologies to China has sent shockwaves through South Korea, exposing critical vulnerabilities in the country’s industrial technology protection regime. This incident, while centred on the civilian semiconductor industry, serves as a stark warning for the defence sector, where the stakes are even higher.
South Korea has made significant strides in defence exports, thanks to indigenous weapons systems like the Cheongung air defence system, the Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher, the K2 main battle tank, the K9 self-propelled howitzer, and the FA-50 light combat aircraft. However, as exports expand, so does the risk of exposing defence technologies directly tied to national security. Modern weapons systems integrate design skills, software, and operational concepts into a single architecture. Even the leak of partial technologies can lead to imitations or significantly enhance an adversary’s countermeasures. The consequences go beyond industrial loss and directly affect the lives of service members.
Park Jong-seung, a professor at KAIST and former head of the Agency for Defense Development, emphasises the urgent need for robust legal and institutional safeguards. “The moment defence technologies are leaked overseas, the strategic advantages built up by the Korean military are eroded, and the competitiveness of defence exports is undermined,” he warns. He argues that the current legal framework, which restricts espionage to acts conducted “for an enemy state,” is outdated and inadequate. Under this framework, even if core design data for Korean weapons systems were sold to a country masquerading as an ally or to a multinational corporation, prosecution under the espionage statute would be impossible.
Park highlights that other countries have taken stringent measures to protect their strategic technologies. The United States enacted the Economic Espionage Act in 1996, treating the leak of strategic technologies as a grave national security offense. Russia has punished scientists who attempted to leak hypersonic missile technologies with charges of treason. Japan and Britain have strengthened economic security laws to block advanced domestic technologies from flowing to third countries. A common feature of these approaches is that espionage is defined broadly, not limited to acts on behalf of an “enemy state” but extended to any foreign country or agent that harms national interests.
Park urges South Korea to shift its legal paradigm to focus on the universal values of national interest and security. He calls for the swift passage of the Criminal Act amendment, already approved by the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee but still awaiting a plenary vote. “The goal is not merely to punish offenders. It is to create an environment in which Korean defence firms can pursue research with confidence and to safeguard national assets created with public funds,” he states.
As the global defence market evolves into a battlefield of information, South Korea must urgently secure this legal lock to ensure that the spears and shields built to protect the nation do not return as a boomerang aimed at itself. The expanding network of subcontractors, the rise in overseas joint development, and the movement of specialised personnel have all introduced new security vulnerabilities. With the semiconductor sector already demonstrating how easily technology can be siphoned off, there is no guarantee that defence industries will not follow the same path.
In an era defined by the U.S.-China technological rivalry, the protection of advanced technologies is paramount. South Korea’s response to this challenge will shape the future of its defence industry and national security.