China’s aggressive pursuit of defence-technology dominance through its civil–military fusion model is reshaping the global security landscape. By integrating private-sector innovation directly into its military-industrial complex, China ensures that advancements in AI, robotics, quantum systems, and biotechnology are rapidly weaponised. This strategy allows for a seamless transfer of data, talent, and prototypes to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), giving China a structural advantage in high-tech military competition. Beijing’s centralized control ensures that every technological gain in civilian industry is quickly repurposed for military use, accelerating capability development and securing long-term strategic superiority across emerging warfighting domains.
India, meanwhile, faces a critical juncture in its defence strategy. The rapid pace of technological advancement in China underscores the urgent need for India to accelerate its own defence-technology initiatives. To remain competitive, India must draw lessons from China’s model and adopt a proactive approach to integrating disruptive technologies into its military framework. This involves joining hands with like-minded nations such as the United States and Israel to become a significant player in the global defence-technology race.
Four core technological revolutions will shape India’s deterrent capabilities beyond traditional missiles and platforms. Firstly, hypersonic weapons are becoming the next battlefield of deterrence. India’s Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) programme must be accelerated to achieve missile defence penetration, high survivability, and swift retaliatory capability. China’s deployment of the DF-ZF glide vehicle makes this an urgent priority for India.
Secondly, Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs) are crucial for multiplying strike effectiveness. MIRV technology enables a single missile to deploy multiple warheads, overwhelming missile defences and ensuring penetration. MaRVs further complicate interception in the terminal phases, making them essential for countering both Chinese missile defences and hardened infrastructure.
Thirdly, AI-enabled Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) will be the nerve centre of deterrence. India must build space-based early-warning systems, AI-enabled threat detection, quantum-resistant encrypted command networks, and hardened communication links for the Nuclear Command Authority. Integrated C4ISR fusion centres will ensure a smarter and safer deterrent, less prone to miscalculation.
Lastly, enhancing survivability is paramount. India must invest in hardened underground silos, decoy sites to confuse satellite tracking, mobile command posts, and quantum communication networks. This will ensure that no adversary can confidently execute a disarming first strike.
The role of the United States in this technological convergence cannot be overstated. Without entering formal alliances, India can leverage US strengths in space-based ISR and early warning systems, underwater technology, and collaboration in AI, quantum, and semiconductor technologies. Selective intelligence sharing on missile warning, hypersonic tracking, and maritime domain awareness would exponentially improve India’s situational awareness. Joint research on semiconductors, AI, and quantum technologies will fortify India’s nuclear command and control systems.
Russia, despite its converging ties with China, remains a vital partner for India. Moscow’s expertise in nuclear submarines, hypersonic technology, and space and satellite collaboration is unmatched. Russia can support India with hardened satellite platforms, radiation-resistant components, and secure communication systems. Diplomatic cushioning from Moscow continues to offer India strategic space in multilateral forums, helping preserve autonomy.
A ten-point action plan for 2025–2035 is essential for India to maintain a technologically superior deterrent. This includes fully operationalising the nuclear triad, accelerating MIRV deployment, creating a dedicated Space Command, building hardened and segregated nuclear command networks, clarifying doctrine, expanding underground silos and decoys, accelerating hypersonic and MaRV programmes, integrating AI and quantum security into all strategic systems, deepening selective cooperation with the US and Russia, and building a civil–military nuclear innovation ecosystem.
India does not need a nuclear arms race. What it requires is a survivable, flexible, technologically superior deterrent rooted in strategic autonomy. The China–Pakistan nexus will intensify, and technological disruption will accelerate. India must respond with foresight and resilience. A carefully crafted doctrinal annex—introducing controlled flexibility—can strengthen India’s posture without undermining restraint. The next decade is not just about modernisation; it is about defining India’s nuclear identity in the 21st century. India must become Atmanirbhar in the nuclear arena—integrating space, AI, quantum, and advanced delivery systems—to ensure an unshakeable deterrent.