For South Korea and Australia, collaboration in advanced defence technologies offers strategic complementarity that enhances shared capability development. Such a partnership could generate synergies to build a stronger regional security architecture and enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Defence-industrial cooperation among Indo-Pacific partners is gaining momentum as countries seek to strengthen collective deterrence and resilience.
India and Japan provide a useful precedent: in November 2024, they signed a memorandum of implementation on the joint development and production of the Unicorn Mast for Indian naval vessels, their first co-development project. This tangible example of regional defence cooperation illustrates shared priorities and a collective determination to strengthen maritime deterrence and information superiority.
Australia and South Korea are well-placed to pursue similar cooperation. Relations are on an upward trajectory, including regular foreign and defence minister meetings since 2013 and the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2021. A 2024 Australia–South Korea joint statement reaffirmed a shared commitment to addressing regional challenges through deterrence, dialogue, and cooperation.
The two countries have complementary strengths and vulnerabilities. For South Korea, the enduring North Korean threat, compounded by regional instability, has reinforced the need to sustain large-scale investment in advanced weapon systems. In 2022, the Ministry of National Defence launched its Defence Innovation 4.0 framework, focusing on crewed–autonomous teaming, AI, and autonomous platforms. The Agency for Defence Development is leading projects, along with firms such as Hyundai Rotem, Hanwha, and Korea Aerospace Industries.
According to the Defence Acquisition Program Administration’s 2026 budget proposal, investment in AI-based teaming systems is projected to rise from about $213 million in 2025 to $378 million in 2026. South Korea pursues rapid capability development through the Rapid Acquisition Demonstration Project, which delivers prototypes within two years, and the Future Challenge Defence Technology Program, which accelerates timelines by advancing technologies before they are formally required.
However, significant constraints persist. South Korea’s limited territory hampers the expansion of test infrastructure, often prompting public opposition and leaving little room for new facilities. Testing and evaluation in confined maritime areas have, at times, raised safety concerns among nearby coastal communities. Beyond these physical limitations, South Korea also lacks a comprehensive defence cooperation framework like AUKUS. Outside its alliance with the United States, it has few institutional mechanisms for joint development with regional partners, leaving it at risk of marginalisation compared with other Indo-Pacific middle powers embedded in minilateral arrangements such as AUKUS or the Quad.
Australia, once shielded by geography, now faces direct pressure from the Indo-Pacific’s accelerating military build-up. Australia’s 2024 Defence Strategic Review warned of ‘the most challenging circumstances in decades’. The 2021 AUKUS agreement has become a central framework for developing future defence capability, but major outcomes—such as the acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines under Pillar One’s Optimal Pathway—will take years to materialise. Any delay risks a capability gap in Australia’s submarine force, while Pillar Two priority areas including undersea warfare, robotics and AI, and quantum technologies are also struggling to maintain momentum.
A cross-cutting structural challenge affecting all major initiatives is the persistent shortage of skilled personnel. This deficit is particularly acute in advanced fields such as engineering, cybersecurity, and AI. Analysts have warned that these gaps risk undermining not only national projects but also the effectiveness of allied cooperation, including AUKUS.
Still, Australia holds advantages that South Korea does not. Its vast land and low population density provide extensive test ranges, including the Woomera Range Complex—half the size of the Korean Peninsula—and northern training areas such as Bradshaw and Mount Bundey. This enables realistic, high-end combined exercises with allies. Australia also maintains strong alliances with the US and New Zealand and close partnerships with Britain and Japan. As a major producer of critical minerals, Australia can also complement South Korea’s advanced manufacturing to strengthen supply-chain resilience.
Practical opportunities are clear. In uncrewed and autonomous systems, South Korea already operates programs aimed at aligning crewed and autonomous assets, while Australia is fielding platforms such as the MQ-28A Ghost Bat and the Ghost Shark, creating prospects for joint development. In long-range strike, South Korea’s missile and precision-guidance expertise complements Australia’s testing infrastructure and urgent capability needs. Supply-chain resilience can be strengthened by linking Australia’s resource base with South Korea’s manufacturing capacity. At the same time, South Korea’s skilled workforce and rapid technological development could help address Australia’s shortages, aligning with AUKUS Pillar Two priorities in autonomy, long-range strike, quantum, and AI.
To realise such cooperation, however, a bilateral agreement establishing the legal foundation for collaboration will