Alexander Cockburn’s prescient critique of the defence industry’s penchant for overpromising and underdelivering resonates loudly in the wake of New Zealand’s recent $9 billion defence spending announcement. The government’s eagerness to invest heavily in private sector tech firms raises critical questions about accountability, expertise, and the likelihood of achieving tangible results. As Cockburn observed, the true believers in defence technology often overlook the stark reality that many of these systems fail to meet their advertised capabilities.
The recent revelations about the US Army’s Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) system, developed by Anduril with subcontractors Palantir and Microsoft, underscore this concern. A US Army report from September 5, 2025, exposed critical security vulnerabilities in NGC2, describing it as “prone to being hacked” and lacking fundamental security controls. The document highlighted a rush to deploy capabilities without adequate oversight, putting mission operations and personnel at risk. While Anduril and Palantir have claimed these issues have been addressed, the incident raises troubling questions: How did such flaws persist undetected, and what assurances do governments have that similar vulnerabilities won’t emerge in future systems?
New Zealand’s track record with US defence technology firms does not inspire confidence. The previous National government’s decision to grant citizenship to Peter Thiel, a major Republican donor and Palantir owner, did not yield visible benefits. Thiel’s influence did not translate into tangible advantages for New Zealand, raising doubts about the government’s ability to negotiate favourable terms with such powerful players. The allure of becoming subcontractors on military-tech projects may blind local firms and the Luxon government to the risks of overreliance on unproven technology.
The recent discovery of highly sensitive Five Eyes meeting minutes in a Salvation Army op shop in Lower Hutt further underscores the competence of New Zealand’s defence and security agencies. The documents, which reveal China as the primary target of Western military planning, highlight a disconnect between economic reliance and strategic posture. New Zealand earns billions from trade with China, only to invest those profits in military capabilities aimed at that same trading partner. This paradox raises moral and strategic questions about the sustainability of such policies.
The Portsmouth papers discussed three key projects: GIDE, Project Olympus, and Bold Quest. These initiatives, integral to the US-led Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) system, aim to integrate allied forces under a unified command structure. The US Defence Department’s emphasis on interoperability and global force integration underscores the strategic importance of these systems. However, the lack of transparency and public discourse around these projects raises concerns about democratic oversight and accountability.
As New Zealand embarks on this ambitious defence spending spree, it must confront the harsh realities of the defence industry. The history of overpromising and underdelivering, coupled with the recent security lapses in US systems, should serve as a cautionary tale. The government must ensure that it possesses the expertise to scrutinise and validate the capabilities of the technologies it invests in. Without robust oversight and a healthy dose of scepticism, New Zealand risks squandering billions on systems that may not deliver as promised. The stakes are high, and the need for transparency and accountability has never been greater.